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1. Introduction
The difference between the Imami and other schools of law does
not concern the permission to dissimulate (taqiyya) in order to protect
the faith, oneself or the community. All the schools permit a believer
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La si‛a imamí está estrechamente asociada a
la doctrina del disimulo (taqiyya). En general,
los juristas imamíes permitieron a los creyen-
tes actuar contraviniendo a la «verdadera»
sari‛a en circunstancias de taqiyya. Para estas
transgresiones permitidas no había castigo, no
se incurría en pecado ni repetición ni compen-
sación con tal de que los actores legales guar-
daran unos límites estipulados. En el siglo
X/XVI el famoso jurista ,Ali al-Karaki intro-
dujo una innovación en las reglas si‛íes de ta-
qiyya según la cual habría una amplia
categoría de actos generados por taqiyya que
no implicaban pecado pero sí una transgresión
legal y por lo tanto el posible requerimiento
de repetir o compensar los actos cometidos.
En este artículo se traduce y comenta su “Tra-
tado del disimulo” y se analizan algunas de las
reacciones posteriores que causó en la juris-
prudencia si‛í. 
Palabras clave: Si‛a imamí; disimulación; ta-
qiyya; jurisprudencia si‛í; ,Ali al-Karaki.
The Imami Shi‛a are particularly associated
with the doctrine of dissimulation (taqiyya).
Generally speaking, Imami jurists allowed be-
lievers to act in contravention to the (true)
Shari‛a in circumstances of taqiyya. For these
permitted transgressions there was no punish-
ment, sinfulness or required repetition or com-
pensation, provided the legal actors stayed
within some stipulated boundaries. In the
tenth/sixteenth century, the famous Arab jurist
,Ali al-Karaki introduced an innovation in the
Shi‛i legal rules of taqiyya, devising a large
category of taqiyya generated acts for which
there may be no sin, but there was still a legal
transgression, and hence the possible require-
ment to repeat or compensate for the acts’
commission. In this article I translate and pro-
vide an explanatory commentary on his “Trea-
tise on Dissimulation”, and analyse some of
the reactions to it in later Shi‛i jurisprudence.
Key words: Imami Shi‛a; Dissimulation;
Taqiyya; Shi‛i jurisprudence; ,Ali al-Karaki.
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subject to the requirements of the law (mukallaf) to act in a way at vari-
ance with the usual demands of the Shari‛a, when the circumstances
demand.1 It is, in a sense, a specific application of the theory of darura,
“necessity”, which is commonly recognised across the schools as per-
mitting the transgression of a specific rule when adhering to it endan-
gers the individual’s life, or the life of his fellow Muslims, or the
well-being of the Muslim community generally. There are restrictions
and conditions, naturally, and there is much debate (equally naturally)
over which actions are, and which are not permitted in particular cir-
cumstances. Dissimulation, though, is not itself forbidden. Where the
Imamiyya are, perhaps, distinctive is in the positive encouragement of
taqiyya as an element of piety.2 For the other schools, it is a regrettable
necessity; for the Imami theologians it forms part of the creedal pack-
age which comes with minority, oppressed status. Through taqiyya, the
individual protects himself or the community, and this act of deliberate
transgression of the law is in a sense, an act of service and dedication.
The moral flavour of many of the statements of the Imams on taqiyya,
for example, gives the impression that it is more than simply an expe-
dient act in line with other dispensations permitted in the law when re-
quired by necessity (darura): it is an act of imitation of the Imams
themselves, and therefore an act of piety. Some have linked this posi-
tive evaluation of taqiyya to a supposed esotericism in early Imami
Shi‛ism. Taqiyya, under such a view, was a mechanism whereby the
purity and exclusivity of the Shi‛i doctrine might be preserved, making
it an expression of deliberate concealment rather than tactical dissim-
ulation.3 These distinctions deserve a separate treatment, and space
does not permit their exploration here. It can be noted here, though,
that in Imami juristic discourse on taqiyya, there is a recognition of
dissimulation as necessary on occasions, but there is little or no evi-
dence that this is due to the need to preserve a secret doctrine which
must be kept pure from the world. At times, the early Imami writers
appear to recognise much religious benefit from acting according to
taqiyya and almost revel in the transgression of the law brought on by
1 See, for example, al-Sarakhsi, al-Mabsut, vol. 24, pp. 38-47.
2 Dakake, “Hiding in Plain Sight: The Practical and Doctrinal Significance of Secrecy
in Shi,ite Islam”. 
3 Amir-Moezzi, “Dissimulation”; and Clarke, “The Rise and Decline of Taqiyya in
Twelver Shi,ism”. 
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taqiyya.4 This contrast between theological and juristic texts is, perhaps,
not surprising since jurists are rarely interested in esotericism (at least
in their juristic writings). Instead, in legal terms, taqiyya is generally
portrayed as no more than a praiseworthy, legitimate and regularly
obligatory act which is an inevitable result of the hostility of the Sunnis
towards the Shi‛a.5
A number of legal issues emerge from the permission to perform il-
legal acts out of taqiyya; the discussion of them has been extensive
within the Imami tradition. In the interests of focussing the analysis
here, I have selected one such issue (the legal efficacy of taqiyya gen-
erated acts), and in the coming pages, examine the innovative answer
of the sixteenth century jurist, ,Ali b. al-Husayn al-Karaki (d. 940/1534),
to the problem. After presenting a translation and commentary upon his
“Treatise on Dissimulation” (al-Risala fi l-taqiyya), I explore briefly
why he argued in this manner, and the subsequent assessment within
Imami jurisprudence (fiqh) of his theory of the division between scrip-
turally and generally permitted taqiyya-acts. Further explorations of the
development of the taqiyya doctrine with Imami jurisprudence will, I
suspect, provide a richer picture of the precision with which the jurists
processed taqiyya. Complex legal problems were posed by the permis-
sion (often outright encouragement) found within the akhbar corpus at-
tributed to the Imams to violate the law under specific conditions.6
One of the more debated issues concerns the status of the mukallaf’s
acts performed under taqiyya – are they legally effective or not? If a
mukallaf is forced to pray in conformity with the Sunni ritual require-
ments or with Sunnis in order to prevent identification (and the prob-
able resultant oppression – i.e. out of taqiyya), then is that prayer valid
or must he repeat it (i‛ada) or make up for it (qada,) at some later point?
Similarly, in non-ritual matters, the validity of a judge’s ruling, working
under taqiyya for an illegitimate ruler, might also be problematic. Does
the rule have proper legal force?7 Need it be obeyed when taqiyya does
not require it? For these specific problems, and for many others dis-
cussed in Imami works of fiqh, the validity of acts performed under
4 Kohlberg, “Some Imami-Shi,i views of Taqiyya”.
5 Kohlberg, “Taqiyya in Shi,i Theology and Religion”.
6 Gleave, Inevitable Doubt: Two Theories of Shi‛i Jurisprudence, pp. 32-41.
7 Madelung, “A Treatise of the Sharif al-Murtada on the Legality of Working for Gov-
ernment”; Gleave, “Two Classical Shi,i Theories of qada, ”.
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taqiyya is subjected to detailed analysis. The general position, though
with some intra-Shi‛i discussion and nuance, is that an action performed
under taqiyya has legal validity. This validity is proven by the Imams’
many exhortations to act out of taqiyya when necessary. The Imams
would not, it is argued (or sometimes simply assumed), encourage the
transgression of the law, and then demand compensatory and penitential
actions for that transgression. Compensation and penitence are required
when one has disobeyed the Imams, not when one has acted in accor-
dance with their commands. It is this question with which al-Karaki is
particularly concerned in his treatise, and the position he advocates is at
variance with the general view that the permission to act out of taqiyya
relieves the individual entirely from the legal effects of disobedience.
One senses that al-Karaki is worried that taqiyya has become an excuse
for legal laxity, and he wishes to establish a mechanism whereby taqiyya
is restricted to actions which are proven and demonstrated. I consider
about possible reasons for him arguing this way in my conclusions.
2. Al-Karaki and his Treatise on Dissimulation (al-Risala fi
l-taqiyya)
,Ali b. al-Husayn al-Karaki, also referred to as al-Muhaqqiq al-Thani
(“The Second Investigator”) by Shi‛i jurists is one of the better studied
figures in Imami intellectual history in the secondary literature.8 A full
biography and assessment of his political is not necessary here, since
that task has been already been presented on more than one occasion.
It is sufficient to provide the outline of his life and scholarly career. He
was born into a clerical family in Karak-Nuh in the Beka valley, then
under Ottoman control. He studied with various scholars in his early
years there, and on his travels first to Egypt, and then later to Najaf. He
was to outstrip his teachers in terms of influence and notoriety when he
entered the service of the first Safavid Shah Isma,il, probably in late
8 References articles include: Abisaab, “Karaki”, EIr, vol. XV, pp. 544-547; and
Madelung, “Karaki”, EI2, vol. IV, p. 610. Other studies include Arjomand, The Shadow of
God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order, and Societal Change in Shi‛ite Iran
from the Beginning to 1890; Arjomand, “Two Decrees of Shah Tahmasp Concerning State-
craft and the Authority of Shaykh ,Ali al-Karaki”; Ja,fariyan, Naqsh-i Khandan-i Karaki
dar ta‛sis va tadavum-i dawlat-i Safavi; Abisaab, “The Ulama of Jabal ,Amil in Safavid
Iran, 1501-1736: Marginality, Migration and Social Change”.
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916/1510.9 The chronicles record him as one of the major arab shi‛ite
scholars who were invited to iran by Shah isma,il, and later by Shah
Tahmasp, in order to inculcate the population with Twelver belief and
practice. These scholars, mainly Lebanese “,amilis” (from Jabal ,amil),
migrated to safavid iran from ottoman lands throughout the period,
making a major contribution to the shi‛itization of the safavid state.10
There is some debate amongst commentators about how many amilis
there were, and their level of influence, but al-Karaki and others cer-
tainly brought a level of external, orthodox shi‛i sanction to the
safavids. in return, he received largesse from Shah isma,il, including
funds for al-Karaki’s seminary activities in najaf. after Shah isma,il’s
death in 930/1524, al-Karaki’s close relationship with the safavid state
continued under the successor Shah Tahmasp. al-Karaki occasionally
held the position of Sadr (chief religious official) at the court, and
schemed to get his opponents removed from office and his students and
supporters appointed to positions of influence. The sanction he gave to
the safavids was controversial. The literature on his relations with other
shi‛i theologians, lawyers and philosophers is replete with tales of per-
sonal dislike and intellectual disagreement. his dispute with the najaf-
based scholar ibrahim al-Qatifi (d. after 951/1544) over the legality of
land tax (kharaj) has been well documented by madelung and modar-
ressi,11 and his dispute with the philosopher and sometime safavid sadr
ghiyath al-din al-dashtaki (d. 948/1541) was clearly part intellectual,
part personal.12 many of the disputes around al-Karaki were linked to
his promotion of clerical authority during the occultation of the imam,
and he was awarded the titles of “delegate of the imam” (na,ib al-
imam) and “seal of the Legal experts” (khatam al-mujtahidin) by Shah
Tahmasp. although these were, obviously, honorific, they do represent
a certain clerical aggrandisement. This close identification with the
safavids is the characteristic most commonly associated with al-Karaki,
which is particularly telling in a tradition where relations with ruling
9 stewart, islamic Legal Orthodoxy: twelver Shi‛ite Responses to the Sunni Legal
System, pp. 83-84.
10 newman, “The myth of the clerical migration to safawid iran: arab shi,ite op-
position to ,ali al-Karaki and safawid shi,ism”; stewart, “notes on the migration of ,amili
scholars to safavid iran”.
11 madelung, “shi,ite discussions on Legality of the Kharaj”; modarressi Tabataba’i,
Kharaj in islamic Law.
12 newman, “dastaki, Ḡiat-al-din”, in Ei, vol.Vii, pp. 100-102.
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dynasties during the occultation of the Twelfth Imam (who is, theolog-
ically speaking, the only truly legitimate ruler) were legally problematic.
His legal output, though, was quite impressive with jurisprudence being
the primary discipline in which he wrote, composing Treatises, com-
mentaries and legal manuals. His promotion of ijtihad as a method of
deriving legal rules was in tune with the orthodox legal doctrine of the
day, at least since the time of al-,Allama al-Hilli (d. 726/1325). Al-
Karaki died in Najaf in 940/1534 during the reign of Shah Tahmasp,
and even his funeral was a controversial affair, with some major schol-
ars absenting themselves.
Much of al-Karaki’s voluminous output has been edited and pub-
lished. The text translated and commented upon here is a short “Trea-
tise on Dissimulation”, forming part of a collection of treatises (rasa,il)
edited by Muhammad al-Hasun and published in 1409/1988.13 The sin-
gle manuscript from which the edition was constructed is found in col-
lection (majmu‛a) no. 4933 in the ayatallah Mar,ashi Library in Qum,
and was copied in 964/1556-57, a couple of decades after al-Karaki’s
death.14 There is no reason, as far as I can tell, to doubt its attribution
to al-Karaki, though it might be said that its ideas differ in emphasis
from those expressed in his Jami‛ al-Maqasid.15 In the translation
below, I give my translation followed by a commentary of the trans-
lated passages. Like much fiqh writing, the expression of ideas is dense,
and assumes a certain level of understanding of the readership. Each
paragraph requires some background information and explication. Al-
Karaki’s innovative theory of the status of taqiyya generated acts was
the subject of some comment by later jurists to which I turn in section 4. 
3. Translation and Commentary
Treatise on taqiyya
[1: Preamble] In the name of God, the merciful the beneficent, in whom I trust,
thanks be to God as is required, and prayers be given to Muhammad and his family.
13 Al-Muhaqqiq al-Thani al-Karaki, al-Rasa,il, v. 2, pp. 49-54.
14 agha Buzurg al-Tihrani, al-Dhari‛a ila tasanif al-shi‛a, v. 4, p. 404 and v. 21, p.
399. The manuscript viewed by agha Buzurg was more recent (it was “included with ma-
terial dated 1100/1689”) than that used by al-Hasun for the edition.
15 See, for example, al-Karaki, Jami‛ al-Maqasid, v. 2, p. 222. A fuller study would
need to be carried out to confirm this supposed disparity.
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[2: Definitions] Know that taqiyya is permitted, and it may even be obligatory.
The meaning of [taqiyya] is to manifest conformity, out of fear, with the people
who oppose [us] in what they profess. The base in this meaning, before there was
consensus, was that which became popular from the different statements of the
Ahl al-Bayt (upon them be peace), and their actions. 
[3. Revelatory Evidence] 
[3.1] It has been said, concerning God’s Word (may He be exalted) “The most
noble of you is the pious of you (atqakum)” (Q49.13) that the meaning [of
atqakum] here is “your actions by taqiyya”.
[3.2] From [Imam Ja,far] al-Sadiq (upon whom be peace) there is [the statement]:
“taqiyya is my religion and that of my forefathers”; not to mention the statement
of Amir al-Mu,minin [Imam ,Ali], “Concerning vilification: insult me, for I am
pure and you are saved.”
[4. Categories of actions under taqiyya] 
[4.1] Once this has been iterated, then it is known that taqiyya could be in the area
of ritual worship, or it could be in other areas of the social obligations. 
[4.2] The action [performed under taqiyya] could be something specifically per-
mitted, such as washing the two feet during ritual purity, or folding one’s arms dur-
ing prayer. Alternatively, it could be something not specifically permitted, rather
taqiyya in relation to that action is derived from the previously issued general state-
ments (‛umumat) and their like.
Karaki’s definition of taqiyya might be considered overtly sectarian:
“to manifest agreement, out of fear, with the people who oppose [us]
in what they profess” (izhar muwafaqat ahl al-khilaf fi ma yudinun bihi
khawfan) [2]. In Shi‛i fiqh works, the term ahl al-khilaf (“those who
oppose”, “the people of opposition”) invariably refers to the Sunnis,
and hence taqiyya is closely linked with the preservation of both self
and sectarian identity. This meaning (murad) of taqiyya goes back, in
its fundamental sense (al-asl) to the Imams themselves [3], and possi-
bly even to the Qur’an (Q 49: 13 is cited and atqakum is linked to
taqiyya). Of the many statements and actions of the Imams which es-
tablish taqiyya’s permissible (and possible obligatory) nature, al-Karaki
cites first a saying by Imam Ja,far al-Sadiq ([3.2] “taqiyya is my reli-
gion and that of my forefathers”) and then, more decisively, a statement
by Imam ,Ali in which he permits his followers to insult him outwardly
if circumstances require it.
The legal processing of taqiyya in al-Karaki’s thinking cuts across
two distinct binary categories [4]. First, there is a distinction between
ritual duties (‛ibadat) and those of social interaction (mu‛amalat).
Taqiyya may be required in either of these categories of duties, though
for actions in each category, there are separate legal ramifications [4.1].
Al-Qantara XXXIV 2, 2013, pp. 415-438 ISSN 0211-3589  doi: 10.3989/alqantara.2013.015
THE LEGAL EFFICACY OF TAQIyyA ACTS IN IMaMI JURISPRUDENCE 421
Alcantara 2 Vol XXXIV (3)_Maquetación 1  09/12/13  17:43  Página 421
Second, there is a distinction between acts specifically permitted under
taqiyya within the revelatory texts, and those which come under a gen-
eral permission to perform taqiyya when the need arises. Once again,
there are distinct legal consequences for acts specified as permitted
under taqiyya (ma,dhun fihi bi-khususihi and I shall call such specified
actions “specified taqiyya acts”) and to acts falling under what I shall
call the “general taqiyya dispensation” [4.2]. The distinction may ac-
tually be explained by the fact that the specified taqiyya acts are known
to be permitted by an explicit text, whilst acts which fall under the gen-
eral taqiyya dispensation need to be argued as such, and therefore stand
on a less sure basis.
[5. Specified taqiyya actions] 
[5.1] Concerning that which is explicitly mentioned in a text, when one performs
it as a permitted action, it is valid and sufficient (sahihan mujziyyan), whether the
individual is free to act or not. With regard to the Law-giver, he establishes that
action in place of what was previously commanded, on account of taqiyya. When
this is done obediently, then all the individual elements [of the duty] are fulfilled.
[5.2] In accordance with this, there is no need to repeat [a specified action done
under taqiyya], even if it becomes possible to perform the action without recourse
to taqiyya before the allotted time has elapsed. I know of no dispute amongst [my]
fellow [Shi‛a] on this matter.
Karaki initially discusses the second categorisation (specified per-
missions vs. the general dispensation). If there is a specific and explicit
revelatory permission (normally from the Imams) to perform an act out
of taqiyya, and the performance of this act contravenes the true law,
then this taqiyya act is not only valid, but it also fully replaces the act
which the individual would have performed had taqiyya not been nec-
essary. One example given is prayer with folded arms (reading al-
takattuf fi-l-salat for al-katf fi l-salat), which, though normally
prohibited, has been specifically permitted by the Imams under taqiyya.
Al-Karaki means here that the individual believer, charged with obe-
dience to the law (mukallaf) may perform specified taqiyya acts and
know that in doing so he or she has fulfilled the law in its entirety. This
is the case whether or not the individual was forced to perform the ac-
tion. That is, the societal situation for the true believers may mean
taqiyya is generally or regularly necessary, but an individual believer
may not be forced to act out of taqiyya in every instance and at all
times. In the latter case, he can, if he so wishes, act in accordance with
the Shari,a. The important point about those cases where the Imams
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have given a specific and explicit permission to depart from the Shari,a
is that in these specified taqiyya acts, the departure is as legal as obey-
ing the true law (i.e. the prayer with folded alms is valid and legally
efficacious), and in the cases where the specified taqiyya act is oblig-
atory, it is a more complete obedience of the law than following the
original, “true” non-taqiyya, ruling. The specified taqiyya act replaces
(perhaps only temporarily) the actual Shari,a. The Lawgiver (i.e. God)
“establishes that action (i.e. the one which the individual performs) in
place of what was previously commanded, on account of taqiyya” [5.1].
The performance of the specifically stipulated taqiyya action is, in
truth, an act of obedience to a direct order of the Lawgiver, and there-
fore fulfils the requirements of the law in the same manner as the non-
taqiyya action it replaces. In such cases, there is no need to compensate
for a supposed transgression. If the action performed is in conformity
with, say, Sunni (rather than Shi‛i) requirements, there is no need to
re-perform the action in a private setting where taqiyya is not necessary,
and there is no need to perform acts which “make up” for some failure
to adhere to the law [5.2]. Specifically permitted transgressions from
the law, it would appear, are akin to other dispensatory acts permitted
in law, such as performing the ritual ablution with sand in the absence
of water (tayammum). They have the same legal efficiency as acts of
obedience performed in non-taqiyya circumstances.
[6. The general taqiyya dispensation] 
Concerning those actions for which there is no explicit text, [these include] per-
forming prayer in a direction other than the qibla, or performing ritual ablutions
with date wine, or the disturbance to continuing [with one’s ritual ablutions] because
the moisture has dried as one sees some Sunnis doing, or marrying a wife even
though there was an intervening period between the request and the acceptance. [In
such circumstances] the individual must [perform such actions out of taqiyya]
whenever necessity requires [him] to do so, in accordance with the [practice of the]
Sunnis, outwardly manifesting conformity to them. This is like the simultaneous
intention to perform circumambulation at the first [passing] of the [Ka,ba’s Black]
Stone when the first part of the limbs of one’s body are alongside it.
Next, there is the general dispensation to act in contravention of the
Shari‛a under taqiyya [6]. Al-Karaki provides examples of actions
which are not specifically mentioned as permissible by the Imams (i.e.
they are not specified taqiyya actions as examined above), but are in-
stead potentially justified on specific occasions due to the general dis-
pensation to act out of taqiyya. The first two such instances he mentions
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are praying in a direction other than that of Mecca (salat ila ghayr al-
qibla) and performing the ritual purification with date-wine. Neither
of these, it appears, are required in order to conform to the practice of
the Sunnis, though one could, perhaps, concoct circumstances in which
one or other of these actions might be required due to an evil ruler’s
capricious decrees. The next two examples, on the other hand, are in-
stances of Sunni practice (or at least the practice of some Sunnis). These
might plausibly require taqiyya generated actions, and relate to purity
law and marriage, even though they have not been specified by the
Imams. The first relates to water drying in the course of the performance
of ritual ablutions. If, during ablutions, the worshipper breaks off from
his ritual washing for some reason and returns to find that the water on
his skin has dried, may he pick up from where he left off and resume
the ablutions, or must he return to the start and perform the whole ritual
wash? In technical terms, the question revolves around muwalat; that
is, whether continued dampness is required for effective ritual purifi-
cation. The Sunnis allowed a break in muwalat, and a resumption of
the ablutions without a restart; the Imami Shi‛a, on the basis of explicit
statements of the Imams, require continued dampness. For the Imamis,
a repetition of the whole ablutions ab initio is necessary when muwalat
is broken. The second example concerns a time lag between the offer
and acceptance of the proposal of marriage. The Sunnis allow an inter-
val, whilst for the Imamis the offer and acceptance must follow on from
one another. In both cases, when taqiyya is required, the individual must
act in accordance with the Sunni doctrine. However, if the person is
able to act in a way which complies with the true, Imami law, then he
is not obligated to act out of taqiyya in this instance, even if the societal
situation of the believing community within the society is oppressive
and requiring “day-to-day” acts of taqiyya as it were.
[7. Compensating for actions under the general taqiyya dispensation]
[7.1] And when it is difficult, then if he is free not to do this action, it is not oblig-
atory for him to do it; and if he is not free [i.e. compelled], then it suffices [when
he does it]. Then if it is possible to repeat [the action] within the allotted time
period after performing it under taqiyya, then it is obligatory for him to do that as
well.
[7.2] If the allotted time [for the performance of the action] has elapsed, then one
must consider the evidence as to whether one must make up for it (wujub al-qada,).
If [the evidence] is such that it is proven, then we are obligated to do it; if not, then
[we are] not. This is because making up [for a missed action] is only obligatory
when there is, in relation to the ritual duties, a new command.
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These two fundamental categories – actions which are specified as
permitted and those which fall under the general taqiyya dispensation –
differ when applied to the issue of the individual’s need to repeat the
action (if possible), and furthermore whether the individual should
“make up” (qada,) the missed duty at some subsequent point [7]. Ac-
tions which are specifically mentioned as permissible under taqiyya in
the revelatory corpus are viewed as sufficient (mujzi) fulfilments of the
law. Actions covered by the general taqiyya dispensation however
should be repeated after the first (taqiyya) performance, if the taqiyya
conditions have lapsed and there is sufficient time [7.1]. If they have
not lapsed, and the time for proper performance passes (i.e. the prayer
time passes without an opportunity to perform a Shari‛a compliant ac-
tion), a further “make up” performance may be required [7.2]. Al-
Karaki stipulates that this requirement to “make up” a duty missed
under taqiyya depends on the discovery of revelatory evidence (i.e. a
dalil) which establishes qada, in this instance. Without the dalil, there
is no requirement to perform qada,.
The distinction, then, between specified and non-specified taqiyya
acts lies in the extent to which they can substitute for non-taqiyya acts.
Taqiyya acts which are specifically mentioned by the Imams as permit-
ted fully substitute for the non-taqiyya acts; acts which are covered by
a general dispensation hold a lower status and do not fully substitute
as they may require repetition and compensation. If time and circum-
stances allow, the usual (non-taqiyya) required duty is triggered and
the individual is obligated to perform the “true” law. Furthermore, if
there is evidence that the failure to perform a particular duty requires
some sort of compensatory act outside of the stipulated time, then the
individual must also perform this compensatory act (i.e. qada,). In
short, the taqiyya acts covered by the general permission statements
from the Imams fall significantly short of full compliance with the de-
mands of the Lawgiver. When possible or required, they must be re-
peated or compensated, unlike specific taqiyya dispensations.
[8. Mu‛amalat and the general taqiyya dispensation]
As for in the area of social duties, it is not permitted for one to have sexual inter-
course in private when under taqiyya in a manner not permitted by the people of
the truth; nor [is it permitted] to make use of wealth taken from a bondsman when
taqiyya requires that one take it; nor [is it permitted] to marry a fifth wife when
one has divorced the fourth wife in accordance with the requirements of the “peo-
ple of opposition” but not of the true school. In this area, one must have a text
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which specifies that one can perform this specific action. If this [text] is found, the
first rule [demonstrating legal efficacy] is proven, and if it is not found, then it is
not [proven].
What is the significance of the distinction al-Karaki insistently
draws here? It is, perhaps, a recognition on his part that the permission
to perform taqiyya must not drift into an acceptance that the “true” law
need not be obeyed. By restricting the circumstances under which
taqiyya acts fully substitute for ideal performance, al-Karaki is resisting
the notion that taqiyya conditions lead to permissiveness. He is also
emphasising the imperfection of the taqiyya generated regulations.
Taqiyya, he is reiterating, is a “less than ideal” circumstance in which
the individual believer finds him or herself. It must not degenerate into
an excuse for failure to adhere to the Shari‛a.
There is, for al-Karaki, a distinction here between ritual acts of wor-
ship (‛ibadat) and the Shari‛a requirements of social interaction
(mu‛amalat) [8]. All of the above regulations relate to the ,ibadat. With
regard to mu‛amalat, taqiyya requires one to behave in such a way that
one outwardly conforms to the rules of the Sunnis. Once that has been
achieved, the dispensation ends. So, al-Karaki states, it is not permitted
to have sexual intercourse (in private, obviously) with a wife married
under taqiyya in contravention of the real law of “the people of truth”.
It is not permitted to use the wealth which was illegally taken from a
bondsman under taqiyya. If one divorces one’s fourth wife according
to the divorce rules of the Sunnis, one is not then permitted to take an-
other wife because one is not yet, in truth, divorced from one’s fourth
wife. Unless there is a specific revelatory text in which the Imam stip-
ulates that this or that action under taqiyya carries the same legal effect
as a non-taqiyya act, then one has to treat the action as being entirely
without true legal effect. Unless specified by the Imam, mu,amalat car-
ried out under taqiyya according to the rules of the Sunnis have no legal
effect. As in the domain of ritual worship, the circumstances of taqiyya
do not, for al-Karaki, provide any grounds for a relaxation of the re-
quirements of the law.
[9. The refutation of the view that there is no distinction between specified taqiyya
acts and acts under the general taqiyya dispensation]
It might be said that there is no difference between the two categories in that what
is actually performed is legal and sufficient in every respect, but this is to be refuted.
In our view, the Lawgiver requires acts of ritual worship in a specific manner, and
arranges the effects in an area by it being in accordance with a specific manner.
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There were those who clearly felt differently. Al-Karaki critiques
those who do not distinguish between specific taqiyya dispensations
provided by the Imams (i.e. “specified taqiyya acts”) and the general
dispensation to act under taqiyya when circumstances demand [9].
Such opponents argue that all taqiyya actions occupy the same position
in that they are all permitted and therefore are all legally efficacious.
Al-Karaki’s arguments against this view depend on whether the action
is an ‛ibada or a mu‛amala. With regard to the ‛ibada, he argues that
the Lawgiver makes the act of ritual worship obligatory in a specific
manner, and likewise stipulates its effects in a specific manner. Without
these specific regulations, a ritual cannot be said to be sound or valid,
and the duty to perform it has not been effectively discharged. Hence
the general dispensation permitting taqiyya cannot be applied to acts
of worship because the operations of acts of worship are essentially in-
scrutable and created by non-rational diktat.
[10. The Limits of the general taqiyya dispensation]
[10.1] The unconditional [general] dispensation to [act out of] taqiyya does not require
more than a simple outward manifestation of conformity [with the Sunnis], whether
the thing which one does is that required [of the individual], or is an act of social in-
teraction acknowledged by the Ahl al-Bayt (upon whom be peace). Any action in ad-
dition to this [outward manifestation of conformity] is not proven by the unconditional
[general] taqiyya dispensation, by any of the various pieces of evidence. 
[10.2] So we say: the one who argues that there is no difference between the two
categories must say, then, that prayer in a direction other than the qibla, be it a little
to the left or the south or even in the opposite direction of the qibla, when performed
out of taqiyya is a sound prayer. In the same way [prayer] in the skin of a dog [is
sound]. If there is a disruption in the performance of [ritual ablutions], then it is
also sound. It is permitted to have sexual intercourse with one whom one has mar-
ried in accordance with their laws, or to marry a fifth wife when the divorce has
been performed in accordance with their [legal opinions] because of the necessity
of taqiyya, or to take the wealth of the guarantor, due to taqiyya, and to use it.
[10.3] And he must [also say] that there is no need to repeat [the act done under
taqiyya], even if there remains time to perform the act of worship because what he
has done [under taqiyya] is sufficient in legal terms. 
[10.4] It is also necessary for him to say that there is no requirement that the indi-
vidual be free in the second category, like the first. 
[10.5] All of these deductions are invalid.
With regard to mu‛amalat, al-Karaki’s argument is pragmatic. The
general taqiyya dispensation from the Imams may be expressed in an
unconditional manner (‛ala jihat al-itlaq), but it is limited to a permis-
sion to “outwardly manifest conformity” to the laws of the Sunnis
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[10.1]. This may mean performing an action which is in conformity
with the true law (i.e. something which the individual is already re-
quired to perform –mukallaf bihi), or it may mean something which is
dubious or subjective, and therefore not required. However, when an
action is carried out purely in order to give the impression of conform-
ity (izhar al-muwafaqa), nothing more than that follows in terms of
legal effect. If one allows acts permitted under the general taqiyya dis-
pensation to have legal effect and to fulfil the law in the same way as
non-taqiyya acts or acts specifically permitted by the Imams, then one
would be committed to a series of ridiculous positions, al-Karaki says.
One would be committed to the following strange views [10.2]:
(1) the person who, under conditions of taqiyya, performs prayer
with his back to the qibla has fulfilled his obligation to pray in the same
manner as one who performs it correctly facing the qibla. (It should be
remembered that al-Karaki had a well-documented dispute with Ghiyath
al-Din al-Dashtaki over the direction of the prayer and was credited with
changing the orientation of the qibla in some Iraqi and Iranian mosques).
(2) someone who, under taqiyya, prays wearing dog-skin (on which,
see below) or after the ritual purification with a break in the continuity
(the issue of muwalat mentioned above) has fulfilled the requirements
of the law. 
(3) sexual intercourse with a woman who is married according to
the rules of the Sunnis, but not according to the true law, is permitted.
(4) marrying a fifth wife after divorcing one’s fourth wife according
to the divorce regulations of the Sunnis under taqiyya is permitted.
(5) making use of the wealth illegitimately taken from the bonds-
man under taqiyya is permitted.
For al-Karaki, the unacceptability of these positions speaks for it-
self. Furthermore, someone who makes no distinction between specif-
ically permitted acts under taqiyya and the general taqiyya dispensation
is committed to the view that an act which contravenes the law com-
mitted under taqiyya requires no repetition, even if there is time enough
to perform the repetition. So in relation to case (i) above for example,
it is argued that even if there is sufficient time for the individual to per-
form the prayer in the direction of the qibla and there is no fear of
reprisal or oppression, he need not do so [10.3].
Karaki has little time for this position. He has already argued that
when the Imams specifically permit an action under taqiyya, then it
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does not matter in any particular instance whether the individual is
compelled to perform the action or not. The Imams’ explicit permission
makes that action as legally effective as the “true” law – indeed, be-
cause the Imam has ordered it, it becomes the true law. However, acts
committed under the general taqiyya dispensation enjoy no such priv-
ilege. For those actions, permission to contravene the Shari,a only oc-
curs when there is compulsion from the “oppressors”, and the requi -
rement to repeat or compensate for failure to perform remains. Now,
the person who makes no distinction between specified taqiyya acts
and the general taqiyya dispensation is effectively saying that there is
no compulsion condition for non-specified acts as there is for specified
acts. The result is a dangerously lax attitude towards the contravention
of the law, allowing many more instances of transgression under
taqiyya because there is no requirement that the individual be com-
pelled in this or that particular instance to obey the law. Once again,
al-Karaki appears extremely concerned that the fact of taqiyya should
not be used as a license for flagrant transgression of the law. The only
occasions when the law may be transgressed without legal consequence
(or rather with the legal consequences of fulfilment), even under
taqiyya, are when the Imams have specified that a particular act nor-
mally forbidden is now permitted.
[10.5] “All of these deductions are invalid” (jami‛ al-lawazim batila)
al-Karaki states, thereby expressing a reductio ad absurdum argument
against those who would want to dissolve the distinction between Imam-
specified taqiyya acts and the general taqiyya dispensation.
[11. The view that praying in dog skin in taqiyya is valid]
[11.1] There has been a dispute about covering oneself in dog skin. 
[11.2] It is claimed that the individual, if he is not able to remove it because of
taqiyya or time restrictions, and he prays in it, then the prayer is valid and suffices
[in legal terms]. And the argument here is based on taqiyya, for wearing a covering
is not an unconditional condition of [valid] prayer, rather it is a general condition. 
[11.3] It is argued that there is a consensus on the validity of the prayer and that
[the duty] is accomplished by it.
In the final section al-Karaki discusses in some detail an issue which
highlights the problematic elements of the view he is attacking [11]. If
someone prays, in circumstances of taqiyya, in dog skin (i.e. an impure
garment), is that salat a valid prayer? Some opponents have tried to
argue that it is, and in doing so, al-Karaki alleges, they have attempted
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to use a specific permission from the Imams for a situation of taqiyya
as the basis for a broader legal argument. Al-Karaki, as we have seen,
wishes to keep the Imams’ taqiyya permission specific to the particular
case they are addressing, and he resists making them generalizable.
The opponents argue that since the Imams allowed prayer in inappro-
priate attire whilst in a state of taqiyya, being appropriately covered up
(satr) cannot be an absolute condition of a valid prayer [11.2]. That is,
the Imams’ taqiyya-based permission to pray in inappropriate clothing
demonstrates that a valid prayer can occur without the worshipper
being properly dressed, and therefore proper attire cannot be an ab-
solute condition (shart mutlaq). The garment (its presence or absence)
during taqiyya would appear unimportant, and so, it follows that a gar-
ment made of an impure substance (such as dog skin) should not in-
validate prayer whilst in a state of taqiyya. The unnamed proponent of
this view further argues that there is a consensus (ijma‛) that such a
prayer will be both valid and a proper discharge of one’s ritual duties
under the Shari‛a [11.3]. The argument here appears as a corollary of
the view that taqiyya suspends much of the usual legal order, and that
this suspension was supported and promoted by the Imams. The view
that prayer in dog skin under taqiyya is both permitted and valid ac-
cords the Imams’ general taqiyya dispensation the power to suspend
established patterns of legal reasoning.
[12. The reply to this view]
[12.1] The answer to this is that being covered in a specified garment in its [par-
ticular] place is a condition of prayer [being valid] by consensus, due to the com-
mand which demonstrates it to be obligatory by His words, “Take your adornment
[at every mosque]” (Q7.31), as well as numerous other [passages]. 
[12.2] The Lawgiver, though, has permitted prayer without a covering and in an
impure garment, or in silk for the man but in circumstances specific [to each ex-
ception]. And hence, [it is true that] covering oneself is not an unconditional con-
dition.
[12.3] However, it is not permitted to bring together these circumstances and their
like together [into a single class of exceptions], as they emerge from the texts [as
individual exceptions]. 
[12.4] The general statement, when it is particularised, remains a proof for what
remains [uncovered by the exception], just as the unconditional statement does,
when it is subject to restriction.
[12.5] As for the claim that there is a consensus on this, then proving this requires
the presentation of the opinions of the jurists on this topic, and [demonstrating
that] they all agree with what he claims, and where might he get this from?
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Karaki replies that there is a consensus that the revelatory sources
require a person to be covered for prayer [12.1]. The proponent is cor-
rect in that proper attire is not an absolute condition, for the Lawgiver
has permitted prayer (and made the prayer valid) to someone uncov-
ered, or in an impure garment, or in silk (for men). However, al-Karaki
argues, each of these permitted departures from the general rule is spe-
cific to the particular set of circumstances. Al-Karaki’s opponent ap-
pears to be arguing that the various exceptions to the general rule
outlined by the Imams can be brought together in a single category,
and hence can be employed equally in each of the exceptional circum-
stances (one of which is taqiyya). For al-Karaki, however, each excep-
tion to the norm is made by the Imam for a restricted and specific
circumstance. “When a general statement is made particular [on one
occasion], it is still a [general] proof for the others; and the same with
an unconditional statement which is restricted” on a particular occasion
by the Lawgiver/Imams.
For al-Karaki, once again, one must distinguish between actions
which are permitted under taqiyya under the general dispensation, and
actions which are permitted and legally valid. For the latter category,
a specific “permitting” text is needed. For prayer in dog skin to be per-
mitted and legally valid in circumstances of taqiyya, one requires a text
from the Lawgiver specifying this to be the case. That the Imams may
have permitted prayer in inappropriate clothes in non-taqiyya circum-
stances does not mean this exception can be transferred to taqiyya cir-
cumstances. Each exception to the general rule is specific and
non-generalizable. Finally, al-Karaki dismisses the claim of consensus
on the validity of prayer under taqiyya in dog skin as simply lacking
in evidence.
[13. The possible support from Shahid I’s al-Alfiyya and its rebuttal]
[13.1] Perhaps it is said that it is proven by the well-known passage from the well
known introduction of our Shaykh on the prayer, known as the Alfiyya: “and in
the same way with the rest of the conditions, such that it is valid for the one who
fails to fulfil them to make them up, except for the one who fails to fulfil the re-
quirement of ritual purity.”
[13.2] The answer [to this] is that this passage, if it were a proof which would aid
him, does not indicate what he seeks because the skin of a dog is one of the things
which prevents a valid prayer (min mawani‛ al-salat). 
[13.3] The passage simply indicates that [prayer] is permitted without the [fulfil-
ment of] the condition. It does not indicate that there is a barrier [to valid prayer]
by some aspects or other. 
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[13.4] As has come in the report with the defective chain from Abu ,Umayr from
al-Sadiq: “Do not pray in any skin of carrion, not even the sandal tie”. 
[13.5] And the repetition of these [sentiments] in the early sources creates a pro-
hibition in areas of ritual worship which indicate that [prayer in dog skin garments]
is defective prayer. 
[13.6] This is an indication of the meaning [of the reports] concerning the disputed
question which is sufficient for one who views it fairly.
The person arguing for the validity of prayer in dog skin returns
with an argument based on a citation from al-Alfiyya, a famous work
on the ritual of prayer by Shahid I [13.1]. In the short passage cited,
Shahid I states that the person who fails to carry out certain elements
of prayer correctly may make amends (i.e. perform qada, according
to a set formulae) for those failed elements only; the prayer itself re-
mains valid. The only exception to this is if the element he failed to
carry out was ritually purity (i.e. he prayed in an impure state). For
that person, it is not that he has performed the prayer incorrectly, but
that he has not really performed prayer at all since a state of ritual pu-
rity is a prerequisite for valid prayer. The implied argument here is that
wearing dog skin is an example of incorrect performance of a valid
prayer rather than performance of an invalid prayer. The failure of cor-
rect performance is, one assumes, relatively minor, and therefore dis-
pensed with under the pressure of taqiyya. Al-Karaki replies that this
citation will not, in fact, help his opponents’ argument because wearing
the skin of any carrion beast (jild al-mayta) is something which the
Imams stated explicitly as invalidating the whole prayer (min mawani‛
al-salat) [13.2]. After a citation of a report from Imam Ja,far al-Sadiq
to this effect [13.4], the treatise ends, rather abruptly and without any
concluding formalities.
4. Reaction to al-Karaki’s Treatise on Dissimulation
Al-Karaki, then, divided taqiyya-generated actions into two cate-
gories: (i) specified taqiyya acts and (ii) acts performed under the gen-
eral taqiyya dispensation. The legal consequences of type (i) and type
(ii) acts are distinct in that the former do not require an immediate com-
pulsion (i.e. the mukallaf could still, without immediate risk, perform
the actions – that is, he has an element of agency – manduha) and they
do not require repetition or compensation. Actions in the latter category
require an element of immediate compulsion, and also require repeti-
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tion (and possibly compensation) if they are performed. Whilst the for-
mer are exceptions to the law (actions rendered permitted under the
specific circumstances of taqiyya), the latter are contraventions of the
law which though not sinful (in the sense of requiring repentance) are,
nonetheless actual transgressions (and hence requiring repetition or
compensation). Al-Karaki’s theory, then, is a modification of what was
the mainstream Imami position that actions performed under taqiyya
are all (be they specified by the Imams or not) acts of obedience to the
Imams’ many exhortations to dissimulate when necessary: under such
a scheme, generally speaking, no repetition or compensatory actions
were necessary for obedience to the Imams’ commands. 
Al-Karaki’s division was not, generally, accepted by subsequent
Imami jurists, though it took some time before his ideas were addressed
directly. His stature as a Safavid jurist may have prevented detailed re-
buttal during the Safavid period, for whilst there are juristic accounts
of taqiyya, none employ this division to my knowledge and none argue
against it. Perhaps it was simply ignored, or more likely, jurists did not
wish to argue against it directly. The first explicit rebuttal I have located
came from the famous Akhbari scholar Yusuf b. Ahmad al-Bahrani
(d.1186/1772), who devotes a few pages to the question in his al-
Hada,iq al-nadira.16 In the section on the validity of purification ritu -
als, al-Bahrani discusses whether a ritual purification (wudu,)
performed in taqiyya and not in accordance with the stipulated rules
of the Imami sect, is sufficient for a valid prayer. Al-Bahrani elevates
this specific discussion to the general discussion addressed in al-
Karaki’s treatise, concluding that al-Karaki’s distinction between spec-
ified and general permission is invalid. Al-Bahrani accepts that there
is no explicit text or indicator which establishes (or refutes) the dis-
tinction drawn by al-Karaki. What the akhbar of the Imams do indicate,
though, is that there was a general exhortation from the Imams to mix
and pray with the Sunnis, even though they may oppose and oppress
the Shi,a. Such exhortations would indicate the validity (sihha) of the
actions performed in obedience to the order, and this validity does not
depend on whether the Imams have, on another occasion, explicitly
mentioned an action as permitted under taqiyya or not. Stipulating a
need to repeat an action (i‛ada) if taqiyya is lifted before the end of the
16 Al-Bahrani, al-Hada,iq al-nadira, v. 2, pp. 316-318.
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allotted time requires, al-Bahrani states, an indicator. The exhortations
establish the action’s full validity as the assumed status of the action,
and establishing the need to repeat the action requires a dalil. “Repeat-
ing the action when there is no indicator has no point” (fa-i‛adatuhu
ma‛a ‛adam al-dalil la wajh laha).17
A similar response was offered by al-Shaykh Murtada al-Ansari
(d.1281/1864), in his “Treatise on Dissimulation” (al-Risala fi
l-Taqiyya), a work which requires a separate treatment.18 In terms of
al-Ansari’s rejection of al-Karaki’s view, the most problematic element
is the idea that there are acts for which there is no text (nass) specifying
them to be permitted under taqiyya. Al-Ansari relies on the established
distinction between the actual rules (al-ahkam al-waqi‛iyya), and the
rules which come into force when the actual rule is unavailable, un-
known or unenforceable in a particular instance (the apparent rules: al-
ahkam al-zahiriyya). For al-Ansari, actions under taqiyya operate under
zahiri rules because the actual law has to be suspended due to the force
of circumstances. The texts which make taqiyya acts obligatory on par-
ticular occasions establish the individual obligatory nature of each act
one might perform. When the Imams mention a particular act they do
so not to stipulate that particular act and not others (in a waqi‛i manner),
but simply to indicate that such an act (i.e. washing rather than wiping
ones feet, or wiping over the socks rather than wiping over the feet)
can be performed in place of the correct act. So, for example:
If we determine that taqiyya causes [the believer] to perform the prayer [in a par-
ticular way], and that [obedience] is not achieved by neglecting to perform the
prayer [in this way], then this aforementioned prayer become individually obliga-
tory on account of the taqiyya surrounding it. This [prayer] is an act of individual
obedience to the obligation to perform taqiyya, not to the broader obligation to
perform prayer in the true [non-taqiyya] manner.19
This individual obligation to act in accordance with taqiyya may or
may not specify the precise actions which the believer should perform,
but it does make that action obligatory individually and specifically.
The individual who performs it has fulfilled the law. For al-Ansari, the
17 Al-Bahrani, al-Hada,iq al-nadira, p. 318.
18 Al-Ansari, al-Risala fi l-taqiyya, pp. 47-49. The treatise has been printed as an ap-
pendix to al-Ansari’s other works of fiqh and usul on numerous occasions.
19 Al-Ansari, al-Risala fil-Taqiyya, p. 49. 
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taqiyya circumstances cast doubt on the applicability of the usual
(“proper”, waqi‛i) obligation in this instance, and the apparent (zahiri)
ruling takes over and constitutes full obedience to the law. The situation
is not, therefore, so different from the one who follows (muqallid) the
ruling of a mujtahid which turns out to be at variance with the “true”
law. The muqallid has fulfilled the law by following the mujtahid’s za-
hiri ruling.
Amongst the more positive (or perhaps more accurately, less nega-
tive) assessments of al-Karaki’s theory are Muhammad Jawad al-,amili
(d. 1226/1811), who describes al-Karaki’s theory in detail and consid-
ers it worthy of consideration (ta,ammul) – not a ringing endorsement
perhaps, but less negative than many of his contemporaries. More re-
cently, ayatallah Ruhallah al-Khumayni expressed support for al-
Karaki’s division within his own theory of taqiyya. This is not the place
to describe al-Khumayni’s theory in detail, but his view of al-Karaki’s
division is positive:
As for matters such as ritual purification and the like, then you already know that
the obvious [message] from most of the general statements on taqiyya [from the
Imams] and their unqualified statements, is that the one who acts out of taqiyya
has fulfilled the essence of what was commanded, and his command to fulfil it has
been satisfied by him performing it in this way. With regard to the things demanded
by the law itself, it is clear. However, with regard to other matters, such as the
ritual purification and washing, then there is some uncertainty as to whether that
is included in the indicators, and whether they are distinct from the things de-
manded by the law. To perform prayer with a purification of this or that sort which
has been forced upon the individual is permitted and allowed. However, after
taqiyya has been removed, then it is not permitted to perform a prayer with that
ritual purification or washing which was done out of taqiyya.20
Unless a ritual washing has been specifically mentioned as permit-
ted under taqiyya by the Imams, al-Khumayni argues, it has no legal
efficacy. It does not make the individual ritually ready for prayer in the
same way as a properly conducted ritual purification, because it does
not have continuance beyond the prayer performed. For it to have con-
tinuance, the Imams must have explicitly mentioned it as being equiv-
alent to the proper ritual purification. The duty to perform prayer is
fulfilled (and here al-Khumayni differs, perhaps from al-Karaki) but
the prerequisites to prayer (such as wudu,) are not fulfilled without ex-
20 Ruhallah al-Khumayni, al-Rasa,il, p. 208.
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plicit designation from the Imams. Al-Khumayni expresses amazement
(al-‛ajab) that al-Ansari rejects al-Karaki’s distinction. Indeed, Khu-
mayni’s whole theory of taqiyya can be seen as a critique of al-Ansari’s
influential al-Risala fi l-taqiyya. 
5. Conclusions
Al-Karaki’s modification of the mainstream Imami position can
plausibly be linked to his adoption of senior office within the Safavid
state.19 With the emergence of a Safavid Shi,i state, the need to act out
of taqiyya was, in al-Karaki’s view, reduced, and the carte blanche ap-
proach to taqiyya of previous Imami jurists sat uneasily with this new
socio-political reality. There was, with the Safavids, no need to act out
of taqiyya, unless one remained within Ottoman lands, and al-Karaki
encouraged his students (and perhaps many ordinary Shi‛a also) to mi-
grate to Safavid Iran. His position on taqiyya, with the division of acts
into specifically and generally permitted (and the legal consequences
which flowed from that), was clearly designed to reduce the ritual and
legal attractiveness of taqiyya. Many acts which were previously al-
lowed to continue without legal penalty or inconvenience created,
under al-Karaki’s theory, the need for repetition and possibly compen-
sation (qada,, “making up”). Taqiyya could no longer be used as an ex-
cuse for imperfect adherence to the law unless the act was specified as
such by the Imams themselves. Al-Karaki’s innovative division was
probably the result of his assessment that the need for taqiyya had
greatly reduced with the advent of a fuqaha,-approved Shi,i state during
the occultation.
It is possible that al-Khumayni’s general approval of al-Karaki’s di-
vision is attributed to similar assessments of state legitimacy during
the occultation. That is, a state which is (minimally) legitimate and
Shi,i, though not led by the Imam is possible during the occultation:
the Safavids for al-Karaki, and the (future) Islamic government as out-
lined in al-Khumayni’s Hukumat-e Islami. Though one is monarchical
and the other avowedly republican makes little difference and produces
the same theoretical legal circumstances, and the theory of taqiyya
19 Newman, “The Myth of the Clerical Migration to Safawid Iran”.
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flows from that. The more cautious position of, say, al-Bahrani or al-
Ansari, reflects their own suspicion of any government other than that
of the Imam. What the discussion around al-Karaki’s theory demon-
strates is that the implications of a particular political theory can drill
down to even the most detailed legal discussions of the maintenance
of ritual purity in a state of taqiyya.
6. Bibliography
Abisaab, Rula Jurdi, “Karaki”, in Encyclopaedia Iranica, New York, Columbia
University, vol. XV, fasc. 5, pp. 544-547.
Abisaab, Rula Jurdi, “The Ulama of Jabal ,Amil in Safavid Iran, 1501-1736: Mar-
ginality, Migration and Social Change”, Iranian Studies, 27, 1-4 (1994), pp.
103-122. 
agha Buzurg al-Tihrani, Muhammad Muhsin, al-Dhari‛a ila tasanif al-shi‛a,
Beirut, Dar al-Adwa,, 1983-86, 26 vols.
Amir-Moezzi, Mohammad Ali, “Dissimulation”, in J.D. McAuliffe (ed.), Ency-
clopaedia of the Qur,an, Washington D.C. Georgetown University, 2013,
available on Brill Online: http://referenceworks.brillonline.com.
Al-Ansari, al-Murtada, al-Risala fi l-taqiyya, Qum, Mu,assasa Qa,im al Muham-
mad, 1412/1991.
Arjomand, Said Amir, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, Po-
litical Order, and Societal Change in Shi‛ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890,
Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1984.
Arjomand, Said Amir, “Two Decrees of Shah Tahmasp Concerning Statecraft and
the Authority of Shaykh ,Ali al-Karaki”, in S.A. Arjomand (ed.) Authority
and Political Culture in Shi,ism, Albany, State University of New York Press,
1988, pp. 250-62.
Al-Bahrani, Yusuf b. Ahmad, al-Hada,iq al-Nadira, Najaf, Dar al-Kutub al-Is-
lamiyya, 1958.
Clarke, L., “The Rise and Decline of Taqiyya in Twelver Shi,ism”, in Todd Law-
son (ed.), Reason and Inspiration in Islam: Theology, Philosophy and Mysti-
cism in Muslim Thought. Essays in honour of Hermann Landolt, London-
New York, I.B. Tauris-The Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2005, pp. 46-63.
Dakake, Maria M., “Hiding in Plain Sight: The Practical and Doctrinal Signifi-
cance of Secrecy in Shi,ite Islam”, Journal of the American Academy of Re-
ligion, 74, 2 (2006) pp. 324-355.
Gleave, Robert, Inevitable Doubt: Two Theories of Shi‛i Jurisprudence, Leiden,
Brill, 2000.
Gleave, Robert, “Two Classical Shi,i Theories of qada,”, in J. Mojaddedi, A.
Samely and G. Hawting (eds.), Studies in Islamic and Middle Eastern Texts
Alcantara 2 Vol XXXIV (3)_Maquetación 1  09/12/13  17:43  Página 437
Al-Qantara XXXIV 2, 2013, pp. 415-438 ISSN 0211-3589  doi: 10.3989/alqantara.2013.015
ROBERT GLEAVE438
and Traditions in Memory of Norman Calder, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2001, pp. 105-121.
Al-Karaki, Jami‛ al-Maqasid, Beirut, Mu,assasat al al-Bayt, 1981, 13 vols.
Al-Khumayni, Ruhallah, al-Rasa,il, Tehran, Mu,assasa-yi Isma‛iliyan,
1410/1989-90.
Kohlberg, Etan, “Some Imami-Shi,i Views on Taqiyya”, Journal of the American
Oriental Society, 95, 3 (1975), pp. 395-402.
Kohlberg, Etan, “Taqiyya in Shi,i Theology and Religion”, in Hans G. Kippenberg
and Guy G. Stroumsa (eds.), Secrecy and Concealment: Studies in the History
of Mediterranean and Near Eastern Religions, Leiden, Brill, 1995, pp. 345-380. 
Madelung, Wilferd, “A Treatise of the Sharif al-Murtada on the Legality of Work-
ing for Government (Mas,ala fi ,l-‛amal ma‘a ,l-sultan)”, Bulletin of the
School of Oriental and African Studies, 43, 1 (1980), pp 18-31.
Madelung, Wilferd, “al-Karaki”, in P.J. Bearman et al., Encyclopaedia of Islam,
2nd edition, Leiden, Brill, 1960-2005, p. 610.
Madelung, Wilferd, “Shi,ite Discussions on the Legality of the Kharaj”, in R. Pe-
ters (ed.), Proceeding of the Ninth Congress of the Union Europeene des Ara-
bisants et Islamisants, Leiden, Brill, 1981, pp 193-202.
Modarressi Tabataba,i, Hossein, Kharaj in Islamic Law, London, Anchor Press,
1983.
Al-Muhaqqiq al-Thani al-Karaki, al-Rasa,il, Qum, Mar,ashi Library, 1409/1988
3 vols.
Newman, Andrew, “Dastaki, Giat-al-Din”, in Encyclopaedia Iranica, New York,
Columbia University, vol. VII, fasc. 1, pp. 100-102. 
Newman, Andrew, “The Myth of the Clerical Migration to Safawid Iran: Arab
Shi,ite Opposition to ,Ali al-Karaki and Safawid Shi,ism”, Die Welt des Is-
lams, 33, 1 (1993), pp. 66-112.
Rasul Ja,fariyan, Naqsh-i Khandan-i Karaki dar ta‛sis va tadavum-i dawlat-i
Safavi, Tehran, Nashr-i ,Ilm, 1387/2008.
Al-Sarakhsi, Shams al-Din, Kitab al-Mabsut, Beirut, Dar al-Ma,rifa, 1414/1993,
30 vols.
Stewart, Devin J., Islamic Legal Orthodoxy: Twelver Shi,ite Responses to the Sunni
Legal System, Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press, 1998.
Stewart, Devin J., “Notes on the Migration of ,amili Scholars to Safavid Iran”,
Journal of Near Eastern Studies, 55 (1996), pp. 81-103.
Recibido: 14/03/2013
Aceptado: 24/06/2013
Alcantara 2 Vol XXXIV (3)_Maquetación 1  09/12/13  17:43  Página 438
